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Tort Law-The Continuing Threat to Privacy by Consumer
Reporting Agencies
Tureen v. Equifax, Inc. I presented the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit with a request to utilize common law tort
principles to provide meaningful protection against encroachments on
individual privacy by consumer reporting firms.' These firms collect
and retain personal information for subsequent dissemination in con-
sumer and investigative consumer reports,3 thereby creating serious
threats to individual privacy. Presently, individuals have virtually no
remedy for invasions of privacy by consumer reporting firms;4 the ac-
tivities of these firms do not fit comfortably within the recognized
classes of the privacy tort, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act makes
insufficient provision for the protection of individual privacy.5 Unfor-
tunately, the court of appeals failed to take the opportunity presented
in Tureen to provide a remedy against abusive reporting practices.
1. 571 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978).
2. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 168la(f) (1976), provides:
The term "consumer reporting agency" means any person which, for monetary fees,
dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the
practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information
on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties ....
3. The Fair Credit Reporting Act defines "consumer report" as "any written, oral or other
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's
credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal charac-
teristics, or mode of living" that is to be used as a factor in determining the consumer's eligibility
for credit, insurance, employment or other purposes authorized by the Act. Id. § 1681a(d).
An investigative consumer report is "a consumer report or portion thereof in which informa-
tion on a consumer's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is
obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or associates of the consumer re-
ported on or with others with whom he is acquainted." 1d. § 1681a(e).
Consumer reports are often distinguished from investigative consumer reports; the former are
typically used by small credit bureaus that furnish information on the credit worthiness of individ-
uals to credit-grantors, while the latter are typically used by investigatory agencies (such as
Equifax) that furnish comprehensive dossiers on the personal lives of individuals for insurance
companies, prospective employers, prospective landlords and the like. Because of the breadth of
personal information included in investigative reports, these reports are more likely than con-
sumer reports to intrude upon individual privacy. Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 MINN.
L. REv. 819, 819-21 (1972).
4. See generally Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy Quest For a Remedy, 57
GEo. L.J. 509 (1969).
5. The Fair Credit Reporting Act was designed to ensure that consumer reporting agencies
operate on the basis of fairness, impartiality and respect for the consumer's right of privacy. 15
U.S.C. § 1681a(4) (1976). The Act restricts access to reports to prospective creditors, insurers,
employers and others with a legitimate business need. Id. § 168 lb(3). Consumers must ordinarily
be notified when an investigative report is requested. Id. § 1681d(a). Reporting agencies must
disclose the contents of their file on an individual upon the individual's request, id. § 168 lg, and
certain obsolete material may not be released except in connection with certain high value transac-
tions, id. § 168 Ic. The Act, however, makes reporting agencies liable only for wilful or negligent
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The Tureen problem began when Equifax6 submitted an investiga-
tive report to All-American Insurance Company7 containing irrelevant8
and allegedly false information9 pertaining to plaintiff's past applica-
tions for life and health insurance. Plaintiff brought an invasion of pri-
vacy action against Equifax in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri. The action, framed simply as an invasion
of privacy,° was based on the inclusion of the irrelevant insurance un-
derwriting history in Equifax's report. Without elaborating on
plaintiff's conclusory allegation of an invasion of privacy, the District
Court instructed the jury that in order to find an invasion of plaintiff's
privacy, they must find that the underwriting history was irrelevant and
that the inclusion of this information on the health report would be
failure to comply with the Act, id. §§ 168 In, 1681o, and forbids an action for defamation, invasion
of privacy or negligence with respect to the reporting of information against the agency, any user
of the information, or any person who furnishes information to the agency, unless false informa-
tion was furnished with malice or wilful intent to injure the consumer, id. § 1681h(e).
Despite rights conferred upon individuals by -the Act, there is strong evidence that abusive
practices by reporting finns, such as failure to verify adverse information, application of pressure
on investigators to produce an unrealistic number of daily reports and quotas of adverse informa-
tion, continue. Comment, Commercial Credit Bureaus: The Right to Privacy and State Action, 24
AM. U.L. REV. 421,426-38 (1975); Note, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Consumer
Reports: Little Brother is Watching You, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 773, 776-82 (1975). See
generally Note, Fair Credit Reorting Act: The Casefor Revision, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 409 (1977).
6. Equifax, formerly known as Retail Credit Company, is the largest individual consumer
investigative firm in the country and has been the subject of governmental investigations on inva-
sions of privacy. See Comment, supra note 5, at 421-26; Note, Constitutional Right ofPrivacy and
Investigative Consumer Reports; Little Brother Is Watching You, supra note 5, at 774 n.4.
7. 571 F.2d at 412-14. Plaintiff maintained a health insurance policy with All-American.
After suffering two heart attacks, he filed a disability claim for benefits pursuant to this policy.
All-American hired Equifax to determine if plaintiff actually was disabled. Id. at 412-13.
8. The irrelevance of information on plaintiffs past applications for life and health insur-
ance included in the investigative report "is acknowledged in the report, where, after three insur-
ance carriers are listed it is stated that '[w]e are not quoting the remainder of the 23 insurance
companies due to their age."' Id. at 422 n.12 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
9. Plaintiff originally brought this action as two claims, one alleging invasion of privacy,
and the other alleging that the report's statements concerning plaintiffs past insurance history
were libelous. Because the statute of limitations on the libel claim had run, that claim was dis-
missed, and the case proceeded to trial solely on the issue of invasion of privacy. Id. at 413-14.
10. Plaintiffsimply alleged that his privacy had been invaded; he did not classify the invasion
according to one of the four torts recognized by Prosser as comprised in the general name "inva-
sion of privacy." See note 34 infra.
11. Mr. Tureen objected to the following portion of the report:
FILE DIGEST: A thorough check of our files reveals no previous claim history on Ber-
nard H. Tureen. The last underwriting report was a special life report done on 6-13-68.
This report was for Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co .... Amount applied for
was $100,000 and at the time he was carrying $4,000,000. Beneficiary was the American
Duplex Corp. of which he was President. Insurance history indicates we had reported on
23 occasions to various account numbers for life insurance going back to 1949. Total
amount applied for for [sic] life was in excess of $10,000,000. ...
571 F.2d at 413.
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offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities."2 A jury verdict for
plaintiff was reversed by the court of appeals.1 3  The court recast
plaintiff's general invasion of privacy action as one for the specific torts
of intrusion and public disclosure of private facts, 4 and found the req-
uisite elements of each tort lacking.
Intrusion and public disclosure of private facts are discrete torts.
The tort of intrusion is composed of two elements: (1) intentional in-
trusion, physical or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another
or of his private affairs or concerns, and (2) the intrusion must be high-
ly offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.1 5 Actionable intru-
sions have been based on nonphysical invasions such as wiretapping,1 6
peering through windows, 17 persistent phone calls,18 and unauthorized
prying into bank accounts.19
The tort of public disclosure of private facts consists of publicizing
matters concerning an individual's private life when the matter publi-
cized is of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person
and is not a matter of legitimate public concern.20 No precise defini-
tion of publicity has been formulated, yet the parameters of the term
are well established. It is clear that publication in any newspaper 2 or
magazine, 2 or by radio23 or television broadcast,24 meets the require-
ment of publicity, while publication in the sense of a communication to
another person sufficient to satisfy the publication requirement in defa-
mation actions does not.25 Confusion exists about what constitutes
12. Id. at 414.
13. The court of appeals held that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion for
directed verdict at the close of the evidence. Id.
14. Id. at 415.
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 808 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
16. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
17. Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
18. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).
19. Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936) (decided on constitutional ground of
protection against unreasonable search as well as invasion of privacy); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq.
386, 146 A. 34 (1929).
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 809-12. Prosser's definition has been accepted in case law.
See, e.g., McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69,78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855
(1976).
21. Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
22. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
23. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Co., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
24. Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Div.-Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d I (Mo. Ct. App.
1971).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Comment a at 384 (1977).
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publicity in the range between media publication and ordinary conver-
sation largely because this question is seldom faced by courts; most
public disclosure cases are based on media publication and turn on
whether the matter involved is of legitimate public concern.
In assessing plaintiffs claim as one of intrusion, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit found two possible bases for an actionable
intrusion: (1) the utilization of objectionable snooping techniques by
Equifax and (2) the mere collection and retention by Equifax of plain-
tiff's underwriting history.26 Because the information disclosed to All-
American was already in Equifax's files, and therefore no snooping was
necessary to obtain the information, the first hypothetical basis posed
by the court was summarily rejected. The court also rejected the sec-
ond proposed basis of intrusion. After a brief discussion of the role of
consumer reports in modern society, the court held that because there
may be a legitimate purpose for the collection of an individual's past
insurance history in some circumstances, the collection of plaintiffs
past insurance history alone was not an intrusion.'
Public disclosure of private facts as a basis of recovery by plaintiff
was likewise rejected by the Tureen court. The court's analysis of this
tort focused on the requirement that there be a "public" disclosure; the
court ultimately concluded that the submission of plaintiff's investiga-
tive report to All-American was not a public disclosure and, therefore,
not an invasion of privacy.2" In its analysis of the publicity require-
ment the court was handicapped by the lack of authority, both in Mis-
souri and other jurisdictions, on the issue of the extent of publicity
required to consititute the tort of public disclosure of private facts. The
court relied heavily on Peacock v. Retail Credit Co.,29 the only case to
address squarely the issue whether submission of credit and investiga-
tive reports'by consumer reporting firms to its clients constitutes a
"public" disclosure of facts. The Peacock court held that the "mere
submission of a confidential credit report, even when it contains false
and libelous information, by a credit information company to its cus-
tomers, is not a 'public disclosure of embarrassing private facts.' "3o
Adhering to this precedent, the Tureen court held that the submission
26. 571 F.2d at 415-16.
27. Id. at 416-17.
28. Id. at 419.
29. 302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1969), aft'd, 429 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
938 (1971).
30. Id. at 423.
19791
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of plaintiff's investigative report to All-American was not a public
disclosure.
The Tureen court's analysis of the torts of intrusion and publica-
tion of private facts is in accord with the modem trend of classifying
invasion of privacy actions in terms of Prosser's four categories of the
tort.3t While disagreement continues about the exact nature of the
right of privacy and the interests it protects, 32 courts have increasingly
adopted33 Prosser's view that the right of privacy spawned a family of
four distinct torts that have little in common except the general name
"invasion of privacy."'34 Courts have foregone any attempt at a com-
prehensive definition of the right of privacy, preferring instead to pi-
geonhole invasion of privacy actions into one of Prosser's categories.
Strict application of these categories has rigidified the right of privacy,
rendering it incapable of accommodating new fact situations. This de-
velopment is contrary to the common law35 origins of the right; initially
31. Prosser classifies invasion of privacy actions into four categories: (1) appropriation of the
plaintiff's name or likeness for the defendant's personal advantage or benefit; (2) intrusion upon
the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (3) public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts about the plaintiff, and (4) publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 802-14. This classification was adopted by the Ameri-
can Law Institute in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E, at 376-400 (1977).
32. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) ("Privacy is the claim of individuals,
groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others."); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (right of privacy based on "inviolate personality"); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383 (1960) (privacy not a right in itself but sum of particular interests in mental tranquility,
reputation, and one's own identity protected by this right); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity:AnAnswer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964) (right of privacy based
on human dignity). See generally Gerety, Redfning Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 233
(1977); Thomson, The Right To Privacy, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 295 (1975).
33. See, e.g., Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496, 499-504 (1966).
34. "The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of
the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in
common . . . ." Prosser, supra note 32, at 389.
Taking them in order-intrusion, disclosure, false light, and appropriation--the first
and second require the invasion of something secret, secluded or private pertaining to
the plaintiff; the third and fourth do not. The second and third depend upon publicity,
while the first does not, nor does the fourth, although it usually involves it. The third
requires falsity or fiction; the other three do not. The fourth involves a use for the de-
fendant's advantage, which is not true of the rest.
Id. at 407.
35. A common law right of privacy was first recognized by a court of last resort in Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). The right of privacy is now acknowl-
edged in either the common law or the statutes of virtually every jurisdiction. W. PROSSER, supra
note 15, at 804; e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 839
(1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-402 to -405 (1978); VA. CODE § 2.1-378 (1978).
The common law right of privacy recognized in state tort law is not to be equated with emerg-
ing constitutional rights of privacy. Although there is no specific mention of a right of privacy in
the Constitution, the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965),
recognized the existence of various "zones of privacy" emanating from specific guarantees found
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characterized in amorphous terms such as a "right to be let alone"36 or
a right "'to determine one's mode of life, whether it shall be a life of
publicity or of privacy,' "37 the early right of privacy provided the indi-
vidual a broad, flexible basis of protection.38
Tureen exemplifies the inflexible approach to the privacy tort
adopted by courts, and the resultant failure39 of the right of privacy to
provide meaningful protection in the modem world of extensive data
collection and dissemination."n The Tureen court narrowly construed
the torts of intrusion and public disclosure to deny a remedy for abu-
sive consumer reporting practices.4" The court could instead have
adopted several theories urged upon it that would have expanded the
existing conceptual framework of the torts of intrusion and public dis-
closure to accommodate the Tureen facts without doing violence to the
recognized elements of these torts. 42
in the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court subsequently held that a constitutional right of privacy
is implicit in the "Fourteenth Amendement's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action" or "in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people." Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Courts have narrowly construed this right, holding thus far that the
constitutional right of privacy protects only the most intimate phases of personal life, such as an
individual's marital, familial, and sexual activities, from state interference. McNally v. Pulitzer
Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76-77 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); Industrial Founda-
tion of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 678-81 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 931 (1977); see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969). For a discussion of the relationship between the tort of invasion of pri-
vacy and a constitutional right of privacy, see Note, Triangulating the Limits on the Tort of Invasion
of Privacy. The Development of the Remedy in Light of the Expansion of Constitutional Privilege, 3
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 770, 299 S.W. 967, 969-70 (1927); Barber v.
Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1205, 159 S.W.2d 291, 294 (1942).
37. See, e.g., Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 38, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1956) (quoting
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 190, 50 S.E. 68, 68 (1905)).
38. Early cases, invoking the common law's capacity for growth and expansion and its adapt-
ability to the needs and requirements of changing conditions, recognized violations of a right of
privacy in varying fact situations. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga.
App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936) (impersonation of plaintiff by defendant's agent for purpose of
procuring confidential information an invasion of plaintiffs privacy); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky.
765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (conspicuous sign in store window advertising plaintiffs debt an invasion
of plaintiffs privacy); Heinish v. Meir & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (telegram
sent to governor bearing plaintiff's unauthorized signature an invasion of plaintiff's right to pri-
vacy); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959) (search of plaintiff by store manager an
invasion of plaintiff's privacy).
39. See Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1974); Peacock v. Retail
Credit Co., 302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1969), aft'd, 429 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 938 (1971). See generally Note, supra note 4.
40. See generally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS AND
DoSSIERS (1971); A. WESTIN, supra note 32.
41. See note 5 supra.
42. 571 F.2d at 416-17. The court's conclusion that the collection of past insurance informa-
tion pertinent to the legitimate business needs of a reporting agency's customers is sound; this
activity is not offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities, and is an indispensable accoutrement
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Specifically, the accepted definition of intrusion is broad enough to
encompass the collection by consumer reporting firms of private infor-
mation unrelated to any conceivable business need, and the distribu-
tion of private information that is relevant to some business need
served by consumer reports but is not relevant to any legitimate busi-
ness need served by the particular report.43 The collection and distri-
bution of private information by consumer reporting firms is arguably
a nonphysical intrusion upon the individual's private affairs or con-
cerns, not unlike prying into an individual's bank account. Unautho-
rized prying into bank accounts has been held to be an actionable
intrusion;44 it is no great conceptual leap to find that the gathering of
personal information unrelated to any business need served by con-
sumer reports is a form of prying into one's private concerns and,
hence, an intrusion. This argument can be expanded to include the
dissemination of information that is relevant to some business need but
is not relevant for the purposes of the particular report. By including
such irrelevant information in its report, the firm is in effect forcing its
customer to pry into the individual's private affairs. The result in both
circumstances is the same: strictly private information has become
known to persons having no right to this information.
The Tureen court did not consider either facet of this intrusion
of modem life. Although this conclusion is sound, the court's reasoning in support is faulty: the
court confused the elements of intrusion with those of publication of private facts. The court
seemingly conceded that the collection and retention of personal data such as underwriting history
constitutes an actionable intrusion because it attempted to justify the intrusion on the basis of
overriding public interest. A legitimate public interest in publicized information is a defense to a
publication of private facts complaint, but it is not a defense to an intrusion action.
Both Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), and Langworthy v. Pulitzer
Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963), which the Tureen court cited in support of ith conclu-
sion, involved newspaper publication of facts about plaintiffs. Neither case suggested that an
otherwise actionable intrusion may be justified by an overriding public interest in the intrusion.
Discussion of public interest as a defense to an invasion of privacy action focused on harmonizing
the right of privacy with unabridged freedom of the press and application of the principle that the
press may report matters of public interest with impunity. 348 Mo. at 206, 159 S.W.2d at 295; 368
S.W.2d at 389-90.
43. The American Law Institute explained the scope of the tort of intrusion in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.
The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has se-
cluded himself .... It may also be by use of the defendant's senses, with or without
mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private affairs, as by looking into
his upstairs windows with binoculars or tapping his telephone lines. It may be by some
other form of investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by opening his
private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank
account, or compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection of his per-
sonal documents.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, Comment b at 378-79 (1977).
44. See cases cited note 19 supra.
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argument, even though a similar argument was raised and rejected in
Peacock. The Peacock court rejected the argument on the ground that
Georgia law recognized only physical intrusions analogous to tres-
pass. 45 Missouri law, the controlling law in Tureen, imposes no similar
restrictions on intrusion actions; 46 thus, the court did not have the bar-
rier to adopting this interpretation faced by the Peacock court.
The Tureen court's analysis of public disclosure was as routine as
its intrusion analysis. Lack of authority on the question of what consti-
tutes publicity forced undeserved reliance on Peacock. The Peacock
court drew on a hodgepodge of Georgia case law to reach its conclu-
sion,4 7 apparently operating on the premise that what is not expressly
included in the concept of publicity by prior case law is excluded. Af-
ter cursory examination of a wide variety of invasion of privacy ac-
tions, the court declared that none of the cases examined supported the
theory that disclosure of private information in credit reports is a "pub-
lic" disclosure. While it is certainly true that none of the cases cited in
Peacock lends particular support to the theory that such a disclosure is
a "public" disclosure, neither do they lend strong support to the theory
that it is not. None of the cited cases dealt specifically with an analysis
of the publicity requirement; in fact, the requirement was not even al-
luded to in a few of these cases.48 Furthermore, because the cited cases
are old, they are not framed in terms of Prosser's categories. Conse-
quently, it is probably inappropriate to apply unqualifiedly the general
statements on invasion of privacy in these cases to the distinct branches
of the tort recognized today.
Of the cases cited in Peacock, Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v.
45. 302 F. Supp. at 422.
46. Jurisdiction in Tureen was based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1976). Missouri substantive law therefore was controlling. 571 F.2d at 417, 421.
47. Two of the five cases relied upon by the court in Peacock, Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga.
161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956), and Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930),
focused on the question of what is a matter of legitimate public concern. The other three, Gould-
man-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957), Haggard v. Shaw, 100 Ga.
App. 813, 112 S.E.2d 286 (1959), and Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57
S.E.2d 225 (1950), involved debtor-creditor situations and application of the principle that a credi-
tor may take reasonable steps to collect outstanding debts without invading the debtor's privacy.
48. Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956), and Bazemore v. Savannah
Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930), involved newspaper publication of photographs and
subsequent resale of the published photographs by the newspaper. The courts explored the scope
of the legitimate public concern element and, peripherally, the question of survival of privacy
actions. Neither case reached the question of publicity, presumably because the publicity require-
ment was obviously satisfied.
1979]
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Zerbst49 offers the best support for the Peacock holding, and this sup-
port is at best ambiguous. The question before the court in Gouldman
was whether a letter written by a creditor to an employer notifying the
employer of his employee's indebtedness to the creditor and seeking the
employer's aid in collecting the debt constituted a violation of the em-
ployee's right of privacy. The court held that this was not an invasion
of the employee's privacy, stating that "in giving this information to an
employer, it [the creditor] was not giving to the general public informa-
tion concerning a private matter in which it had, or could have, no
legitimate interest," since an employer has a "natural and proper inter-
est in the debts of his employees." 50 It stretches credibility to infer that
the court intended a meaningful exposition of the term "publicity" by
this oblique reference to the general public. Any analogy drawn be-
tween a creditor and a consumer reporting firm would be inappropri-
ate. The case belongs in a class of debtor-creditor cases5' that
recognizes that creditors can take reasonable steps to collect debts with-
out interfering with the debtor's right of privacy;5" it did not deal with
the specific torts of public disclosure and intrusion as they are recog-
nized today.
Davis v. General Finance & Thrift Corp., also cited in Peacock,
offered no support for the Peacock holding. The issue of publicity was
never reached in Davis, and there are even implications that disclosure
to one or a few individuals may satisfy the publicity requirement.
Plaintiff in Davis brought an action for libel and for invasion of pri-
vacy, both of which were based on publication by telegram of plaintiff's
debt to General Finance and Thrift Corporation.54 The telegram in
question was sent by defendant to plaintiff notifying him of his unpaid
debt; only Western Union employees who handled the message in the
course of its transmission could have seen the message. The Davis
court raised no objections to the invasion of privacy claim based on
"publication by telegram"; instead, the court dismissed the claim on the
basis that the telegram was not a flagrant breach of decency and propri-
ety55 and therefore was inoffensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
49. 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957).
50. Id. at 683-84, 100 S.E.2d at 883.
51. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 154, 158 (1970).
52. Haggard v. Shaw, 100 Ga. App. 813, 112 S.E.2d 286 (1959), reiterated the principle estab-
lished in Gouldman without further clarification. The fact situation in Haggard is practically
identical to that of Gouldman, and the court simply borrowed the Gouldman holding.
53. 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950).
54. Id. at 708, 57 $.E.2d at 226.
55. Id. at 710-11, 57 S.E.2d at 227.
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INVASION OF PRIVACY
Tureen perpetuated this superficial treatment of authority in its ex-
amination of Missouri case law.56 Biederman's of Springfeld, Inc. v.
Wright,57 cited as support for the proposition that public means "af-
fecting the community at large, '58 is actually authority for a more cir-
cumscribed definition of publicity. The court in Biederman's quoted
Prosser's expansive definition of publicity,59 but the facts of the case
indicate that such a broad definition of publicity could not have been
operative in the court's decision. The invasion of privacy claim in Bied-
erman's was based on the conduct of defendant store's collection agent.
The agent followed plaintiff around the cafe in which she worked on
three separate occasions, loudly declaring that plaintiff and her hus-
band were "deadbeats" and refused to pay their bills.60 The court
found that the agent's oral publication of plaintiffs debt in the cafe
satisfied any "reasonable requirement" of publicity. 61
The Tureen fact situation could easily have been brought within
the public disclosure of facts tort had the court not placed so much
weight on the actual number of persons apprised of particular facts.
The tort does not require that a communication actually reach a large
number of people, it merely requires that it have that potential.62 The
likelihood of widespread dissemination can be inferred from the me-
dium employed. A consumer reporting firm provides a means of dis-
seminating information as do newspapers, magazines, and public
records. Judge Hleaney, in his dissenting opinion, argued persuasively
that the medium of the consumer reporting firm provides a sufficient
likelihood of widespread dissemination to satisfy the publicity require-
ment of the public disclosure tort.63 Considering the practices of the
56. Two cases cited by the court, Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911),
and Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), involved publication in a newspa-
per and magazine respectively, thus obviating the need for analysis of the publicity requirement.
57. 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959).
58. 571 F.2d at 419.
59. 322 S.W.2d at 398. Prosser defined publicity as "communication to the public in general
or to a large number of persons, as distinguished from one individual or a few." PROSSER ON
TORTS § 97, at 641 (2d ed. 1955). The present Restatement definition of publicity is a refinement
of Prosser's definition. "Publicity. . .means that the matter is made public, by communicating it
to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially
certain to become one of public knowledge." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Com-
ment a at 384 (1977).
60. 322 S.W.2d at 893-95.
61. Id. at 898.
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Comment a at 384 (1977) (tort of public
disclosure requires "a communication that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public") (emphasis
added); Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 683-84
(Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
63. 571 F.2d at 420 (dissenting opinion).
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consumer reporting industry,' this is a much more realistic view than
that of the majority. Disclosure of private information in credit reports
does not end with its disclosure to one customer; information gathered
on individuals is retained in the files of the reporting office for use in
later reports made to any number of customers. While reporting firms
are prohibited by law from giving credit reports to those who do not
have a "legitimate" interest in them,65 this restriction is difficult to
enforce because of the vaguness of the term "legitimate business
purpose.
'66
In reaching its conservative result, the Tureen court may simply
have been following the directive to federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction to apply rather than expand state tort law. Nevertheless,
the Tureen court had the conceptual framework at its disposal to ex-
pand the torts of intrusion and public disclosure of private facts to in-
clude the collection and dissemination of private information by
consumer reporting firms, but refused to adopt the proferred interpreta-
tions. This unfortunate refusal denies individuals a much needed rem-
edy against abusive practices of the consumer reporting industry and
presents additional precedent for the narrow interpretation of publicity
adopted in Peacock. State courts faced with a fact situation similar to
the one presented in Tureen should consider Tureen in its proper juris-
dictional posture and not feel constrained by it from expanding state
tort law to provide a remedy.'
SABRA J. FAIRES
64. Credit and investigative reports are used extensively by creditors, insurance companies,
landlords, employers and numerous departments of the federal government such as the Justice
Department, the Civil Service Commission, and the Veterans Administration. Note, Constitu-
tional Right of Privacy and Inpestigative Consumer Reports: Little Brother Is Watching You, supra
note 5, at 811-12.
65. The Fair Credit Reporting Act prohibits furnishing a consumer report except with the
consumer's permission or for specified legitimate purposes. The legitimate purposes enumerated
in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3) (1976) are credit transactions, employment purposes, insurance underwrit-
ing, and the granting of government licenses or benefits. Section 168lb(3)(E), however, contains a
catch-all for all purposes not specifically listed; it authorizes consumer reporting firms to give
reports to anyone who "has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a
business transaction involving the consumer." Id. § 1681b(3)(E).
66. Fair Credit Reporting Act: Hearings on S. 2360 Before the Subcommr on Consumer Credit
o/Senate Comm on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 687 (1973) (state-
ment of Albert Foer).
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